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Introduction
The Delaware Supreme Court first upheld a poison
pill share-rights plan created by the defendant corporation
in Moran v. Household International. 1 Although the Delaware
Supreme Court approved this defensive weapon in the pre-
tender offer context, it warned that 'the ultimate response
to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors'
action at that time. Their use of the Plan will be
evaluated when and if the issue arises.' 2
Because poison pills can make a takeover that the
target corporation's directors oppose virtually impossible,
many commentators argue that poison pills are merely an
entrenchment device used by target directors to preserve
their jobs. 3 However, supporters of the poison pill contend
1
. 500 A. 2d 1346, (del.), aff'g 490 A. 2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985).
2
. 500 A. 2d at 1357.
. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control,
Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,018,
88,200, (July 31, 1986) [hereinafter Poison Pill Release]. This release
requested public comment on the possibility of a federally promulgated
shareholder approval rule for all poison pill plans. The responses are
available to the public in File No. S7-18-86 at the Public Document
Room of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20549.
'Poison pills are devices adopted by corporations--without shareholder
^ consent--that erect insurmountable barriers to offers from outside
bidders for a company's shares—except those favored by management.'
that the adoption of poison pills allows management to
negotiate in the best interests of the shareholders, to
protect shareholders from tender offers at inadequate
prices and to forestall abusive takeover practices such as
partial offers. The central issue now, however, is whether
and under what circumstances a board of directors has a
duty to redeem a poison pill during a takeover attempt; 5 and
whether we should limit the power of board of directors and
how we should.
Clafman & Schlefer, The Fuss Over Poison Pills: Recipe for a Management
Autocracy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1986, at F2, col. 3.
4
. Poison Pill Release, supra note 5, at 84,018.
'The Pill gives targets more time, and thus a better opportunity to
negotiate with a white knight or even with the raider. In these
respects, the pill is beneficial to shareholders. It creates the
opportunity to maximize shareholder values.' Lipton, The Fuss Over
Poison Pills: A Sensible Deterrent to Takeover Mania, N.Y. Times, Dec.
14, 1986, at F2, col. 2.
. Some changes in corporate control, such as a merger, are negotiated
or 'friendly' acquisitions. The management of the two corporations
bargain over the terms, conditions and future management. If the target
corporation's board of directors approves of the merger, it is
submitted to the corporation's shareholders for approval. When a
'friendly acquisition' cannot be arranged, the bidder may seek to gain
control through a hostile takeover. The bidder makes a tender offer
directly to the shareholders, thereby bypassing the board of directors.
See L. Solomon, D. Schwartz & J. Bauman, Corporations, Law and Policy:
Materials and Problems 1033-34 (2d ed. 1988); see also E. Aranow & H.
Einhorn, Tender Offers for Corporate Control 70 (1973) (a tender offer
is ' [a] public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a
group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a
portion of ... securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified
price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities') . Congress
regulates tender offers through the Williams Act. Corporate Equity
Ownership-Disclosure (Williams) Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. sec. 781-78n (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Other less frequently used methods of gaining control include proxy
contests, see L. Solomon, D. Schwartz & J. Bauman, supra, at 1040-43,
and market sweeps, see Note, Proposed SEC Regulation of Market Sweeps:
Should Market Sweeps Be Governed By The Williams Act?, 56 Fordham L.
Rev. 797 (1988)
.
This thesis reviews diverse interpretations of the
function of poison pills in light of recent judicial
decisions and underlying empirical evidence; as well as
reviews recent judicial decisions regarding the new version
of poison pill--dead hand pill. This article also discusses
the recent trend of by-law restrictions in an attempt to
limit the abusive use of poison pills. The conclusion drawn
is that poison pill plans must be designed to encourage
bargaining between target management and hostile acquirers.
I. Poison Pill: Defensive Tactics
that Impact Corporate Takeovers
A. Basic Design of Poison Pill
Originally known as "poison pill preferred stock,
"
6 the
term "poison pill" now refers to a share purchase rights
plan - a corporate defensive measure designed to deter
hostile bidders from purchasing control of a company. A
target company' s board of directors usually creates a
rights plan without a shareholder vote. The board
authorizes the creation and distribution to its common
stockholders of a dividend of one right for each share of
common stock they own. The right entitles the shareholder
to purchase common or preferred stock of the target company
or any potential acquirer. Initially the rights are
transferable only with the stock and are not exercisable.
However, once a "triggering event" occurs, such as the
acquisition of more than a specified percentage of the
6
. The original poison pill plans were devised in 1983 by Martin
Lipton, a senior partner in the New York law firm of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, on behalf of Lenox, Inc. See Allen & Swartz, Lenox
Rebuffs Brown-Forman, Adopts Defense, Wall. St. J., June 16, 1983, at,
col. 2 (widw. ed.). A memorandum written by Mr. Lipton describing early
poison pill plans appears in R. GILSON, THE LAW & FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITION 637-39 (1986)
.
target company's stock,' new rights certificates are
distributed to the target company's stockholders and these
Q
certificates become exercisable. However, any unexercised
rights may be redeemed by the target company' s board of
directors at a nominal price.
1. Convertible Preferred Stock Provision
A convertible preferred stock dividend plan formed
the cornerstone of the first poison pill introduced by
Lenox, Inc. in June 1983. This plan was used by target
companies to protect shareholders from partial and front-
end loaded, two-tier offers. 10 Pursuant to this plan common
. The definition of a triggering event can vary between Rights Plans.
One common definition is "the earlier of ten days after an entity
acquires a certain percentage of the issuer's stock (typically 20%) or
commences a tender offer that would result in the acquiring person (the
bidder) owning a certain percentage of the issuer's stock (typically
30%)." Anthony Augliera, Shareholder Rights Plans: Saying No to
Inadequate Tender Offers, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 803, 808 n.33 (1989).
. The following Rights Plan terms are taken from 1 Moody's Bank and
Finance Manual 1602 (1990), 1602 (cited in note 24):
Initially, the rights will not be exercisable and will transfer with
and only with the shares of common stock. The rights will be
exercisable and separately transferable twenty business days after a
person or group of persons acquires generally 15% or more of Bancorp'
common stock, or twenty business days, or such later date as may be
determined by the Board of Directors' after a person or group announces
a tender offer the consummation of which would result in ownership by a
person or group of persons of generally 15% or more of the common
stock. Id.
9
. Pitt & Buthusiem, Tender Offers: Offensive and Defensive Tactics and
the Business Judgment Rule, 1 BLOCK & PITT, HOSTILE BATTLS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 1986 323, 324 (1986) .
10
. American Law Institute-American Bar Association Comm. on Continuing
Professional Educ, Takeover Defenses and Director's Liabilities 95 (M.
stockholders of the issuer are issued a pro rata dividend
consisting of convertible preferred stock. 1 At a specified
period (e.g., thirty days) following a bidder's acquisition
of control of the target company, the preferred holders are
entitled to redeem their shares for a "fair price" set by
the plan. 1 ' This price is determined through a formula
provided in the plan, which may reflect the average price
for the issuer' s common stock over a specified period of
time. However, exercise of this redemption right may be
subject to suspension for a period of time (e.g., 120 days)
in the event of a publicly announced intention to
consummate certain business combinations. In this event, if
the business combination is consummated within the allotted
time, the right of redemption is extinguished. After a
significant period of time has elapsed, the issuer may be
able to redeem the poison pill stock at a price stipulated
in the plan and typically set in excess of the current
market price of the common stock. This price may reflect
the long-term value of the issuer. An Acquiring Person,
Lipton ed. 1986)
.
Veasey, Flinklestein & Abrams, Selected Tactics in Control
Contests, supra note 14, at 78 (1086)
.
however, is never permitted to participate in any issuer
redemption of the poison pill stock. 13
Alternatively, in the event of a substantial stock
acquisition followed by a second-step merger, the preferred
stock of the target can be exchanged for an equivalent
amount, as determined by the plan, of voting stock of the
acquiror or surviving corporation with all of the rights,
powers, privileges, and preferences with respect to the
Acquiring Person or survivor to which such convertible
preferred stock had been entitled from the issuer. 14
Consequently, these two provisions deter
acquisition by either depleting the target's assets or
diluting the value of acquiror's stock. 15 If a business
combination is consummated, the provision of the Acquiring
Person' s existing stockholders would be diluted through the
conversion of the preferred stock of the issuer into voting
stock of the Acquiring Person. If the bidder acquires a
stock position but no business combination is consummated,
the issuer' s assets could be depleted by the payment to
stockholders of the issuer's 'fair value' through
12
13
. Id. at 429
. Id. at 430.
14
. Takeover Defenses and Director's Liabilities, supra note 15, at 96.
15
. The Poison Pill Preferred, 97 Harv. L.Rev. 1967 (1984).
redemption of the preferred stock upon demand by the
holders thereof 16
2. Flip-Over Provisions 17
Under the flip-over plan, common stockholders of
the target corporation typically receive a pro rata
dividend consisting of a right or warrant to purchase
common or preferred stock, or both, of the issuer. The
rights or warrants generally have a fixed-term existence
(e.g., ten years 18 ) . Prior to the occurrence of a triggering
event, such as the acquisition of a stipulated amount of
stock 19 (e.g., fifteen percent or more 20 ), or the
16
. id.
17
. In this kind of plan, the dilution effect of the poison pill flips
over to the acquiror's corporate, not the target corporate. So it is
named as "flip-over provision". See 1 TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 15,
at 96-101; Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 14, at 426-28; Selected
Tactics in Control Contests, supra note 14, at 83-85. In Moran the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a flip-over pill. See
also 1 Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & Alexander R. Sussman, Takeover Defenses
s 5.04 [A], at 64-69; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE ECONOMICS OF POISON PILLS (March 5, 1986), at 4-5.
18
. A few corporations (notably Pennzoil and National Intergroup) have
adopted rights plans that expire automatically after a specified period
of years (in the examples above, three or five, respectively) unless
the stockholders expressly authorize their continuation. The theory
behind these plans is that they can be used to respond to particular
threats or applied during unique periods of the corporation' s history
without entrenching the Board for a long period of time. National
Intergroup' s plan was devised with the input of one of its large
institutional investors.
19
. Dawson, Pense & Stone, supra note 14, at 426 (including the
threshold under the Federated right plan as 20% of the company's
stock)
.
announcement or commencement of a tender offer for a
specified percentage of the issuer's stock (e.g., thirty
percent or more), 21 the rights are subject to redemption by
the board of directors and can neither be exercised nor
transferred separately. 2.
At or shortly after the occurrence of a triggering
event, certificates evidencing the rights are distributed
to common stockholders and the rights become exercisable,
tradable, and, when so provided in the plan, non
redeemable. 2 If the acquiror triggers the plan and then
proceeds with a merger or similar business combination
transaction, the flip-over provision entitles each rights
holder to purchase the acquiror' s common stock at a
substantial discount. Because the flip-over provision does
not operate unless the bidder attempts to acquire all the
target company' s stock by a merger or by some other type of
business combination, flip-over pills do not prevent all
. The general trends is that the triggering percent is becoming lower
and lower. Some courts even recognize 10% as a triggering percentage.
21
. Under the Federated plan, the commencement of a tender offer for
30% is a triggering event, CRTF Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 98,118.
Id. Initially, the rights are transferable only when the common
stock are not exercisable.
. Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 14, at 427; Veasey, Finklestein &
Abrams, supra note 14, at 81.
10
cash tender offers for all of the target's shares, or open-
market purchases of a controlling interest in the target. 2
The exercise price for acquisition of the issuer's
stock pursuant to the rights may reflect an attempt to
establish the long-term value of the issuer over the life
of the plan or may be set at a level that bears no relation
to the issuer's value. Exercise of the rights generally
becomes economic only in the event of a business
combination involving the issuer that triggers the flip-
over provision and entitles the holders of the rights to
purchase, at a discount, common or preferred stock, or
both, in the Acquiring Person or surviving corporation. For
example, assuming an exercise price of $150, the standard
flip-over poison pill plan would require that, in order for
the issuer to consummate a merger into an Acquiring Person,
the merger agreement must provide that the rights holders
can purchase $300 worth of the Acquiring Person' s common
stock for $150. This has the effect of substantially
diluting the equity of the Acquiring Person' s existing
stockholdings, thereby giving flip-over provisions their
significant deterrent effect.
2,1
. 1 A Fleischer, supra note 16, at 69; Poison Pill Effects, supra
note 16, at 122 (Mar. 5, 1986)
.
II
3 Flip-In Provisions 25
Poison pill plans with flip-in provisions consist
of a standard flip-over rights plan with additional flip-in
features. Flip-in provisions enable common stockholders
other than the acquiror, 26 to purchase shares of stock of
the target company at a bargain price following certain
self-dealing 27 or triggering events.
Flip-in provisions have the effect of diluting the
investment and voting power of an Acquiring Person in the
In this kind of plan, the dilution effect flips into the target
corporate, not the acquiror corporate. So it is named as "flip-in
provision". See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 16, at 71-92; Dawson, Pence
& Stone, supra note 14, at 28; Herzel & Shepro, The Changing Fortunes
of Takeover Defenses, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 116 (1987). Flip-in plans have
met some opposition in the courts. See Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL
Indus., 644 F.Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir.
1987); R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Wis.
1986); Dynamics Corp. of American v. CTS Corp., 637 . F. Supp. 406 (N.D.
111. 1986), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986). But See CRTF Corp.,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder} Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 98,122-23;
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946 (Del. 1985).
26
. This treatment among shareholders is discriminatory and has
prompted several courts to consider flip-in provisions unlawfully
discriminatory. See, e.g., Amalgamates Sugar Co. v. UL Indus., 644
F.Supp. 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A. 2d 946 (Del. 1985); CRTF Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder}
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 98,122-23.
Identified selfdealing transactions created in flip-in rights to
include
:
(1) mergers of the acquiror or an affiliate into the target
where the other stockholders are not squeezed out;
(2) transfers of assets to the target for target stock;
(3) sales, purchases, or pledges to, from, or with the target
of any assets;
(4) receipt of employment compensation from the target;
(5) receipt of loans from the target; and
(6) reclassifications, such as reverse stock splits, that
12
issuer. This effectively prevents an Acquiring Person from
purchasing a substantial block of the issuer' s stock
through open market purchases, negotiated sales, or partial
tender offers, and encourages acquirors to negotiate with
the target company' s board of directors during a takeover
contest to avoid dilution in the value of the target's
shares
.
4 . Back-End Provisions 28
Poison pill plans with back-end provisions
generally involve the issuance, as a dividend to common
stockholders of the issuer, of a right to tender their
common stock to the issuer for a package of securities upon
the occurrence of specified triggering events. Prior
thereto, the rights are not exercisable, are redeemable by
the issuer's board of directors for a nominal price, and
trade with common stock. Following the occurrence of
certain triggering events (e.g., acquisition of a specified
amount of the issuer's capital stock), the rights become
increase the acquiror's percentage holdings.
Under this kind of plan, the stocks come back to the target
corporate upon the occurrence of specified triggering events. So it is
named as "back-end provision." See POISON PILL ECONOMICS, supra note
16, AT 6; 1 TAKEOVER DEFENSES, supra note 15, at 101-02; 1 A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 16, at 70-71; Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note
14, at 428-29; Selected tactics in Control Contests, supra note 6, at
87-98. Courts have enjoined the use of note purchase plans in at least
three cases. See Edelman, 798 F.2d at 882; Minstar Acquiring Corp. v.
13
nonredeemable and exercisable to all common stockholders,
except acquiring persons, through tender of their common
stock to the issuer.
In one version of the back-end plan, the
exercisability of the rights will be delayed for a
specified period of time, e.g., 120 days, if the acquiring
person publicly proposes to consummate a cash transaction
to acquire any and all outstanding shares of the issuer'
s
stock for a price at or above the stipulated value of the
issuer's securities package. Another form of back-end plan
removes the requirement for common stockholders to actually
tender their common stock to the issuer by granting to
stockholders the right, following a business combination or
tender offer, to receive the difference between the
stipulated back-end price less the average price paid by
the bidder for the issuer's securities (as determined
according to a formula specified in the plan)
.
29
5. Voting Provisions
While not viewed as a garden variety poison pill,
defensive measures with voting provisions typically involve
the issuance, by way of a dividend to common stockholders,
AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Revlon, 506 A. 2d at 173.
See, e.g., Rights Agreement between Michigan Nat'l Corp. and
14
of securities having special voting powers. In one version,
preferred stock is issued to common stockholders of the
issuer with certain supervoting privileges under specified
circumstances for the purported purpose of severely
diluting the voting power of a bidder seeking control.
Under another plan, common stockholders are issued
securities with voting rights that increase with the length
of time the securities are held. These plans are relatively
easy to implement where the issuing corporation has
authorized preferred stock with flexible voting feature
available
.
B. the New Frontier: Dead Hand Pill
In recent years, many companies have adopted
shareholder rights plans which include continuing director
("dead hand") provisions. Continuing director provisions,
such as the one adopted by Healthdyne, 3 generally permit
the redemption or amendment of the company' s rights plan
only by one or more continuing directors - a term typically
defined to include directors who were in office when the
plan was adopted or who were subsequently elected to the
board with the recommendation and approval of the directors
Michigan Nat'l Bank, dated as of July 10, 1986.
See Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies Inc., 968 F.Supp.
15
in office, or directors who joined the board after a change
of control but with the approval of continuing directors. 3
There are a number of different varieties of
continuing director provisions. One type acts as an
absolute prohibition against a newly elected board
redeeming rights without the consent of the requisite
number or percentage of the continuing directors. 3 ' A second
type of continuing director provision -- similar to the one
added in the Bank of New York decision -- does not provide
an absolute prohibition against redemption of rights by a
newly elected board, but instead typically allows a newly
elected board to redeem the rights if (1) the noncontinuing
directors "were elected by an affirmative vote of the
holders of at least two-thirds of the issued and
outstanding shares" of the company or (2) for some period
of time before and after the election of such noncontinuing
directors, no merger, consolidation, or other business
combination involving the company is proposed. 3 A third
variation is a "deferred redemption" dead-hand provision,
which provides an absolute prohibition on the newly
1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
.
See Lese, "Preventing Control From the Grave: A Proposal for
Judicial Treatment of Dead Hand Provisions in Poison Pills," 96 Colum.
L. Rev. 2175, 2191 (1996)
.
32
. Id.
16
elected, noncontinuing, directors redeeming the target's
right plan, but only for a fixed period of time (e.g., 180
days) after their election.
Continuing director provisions are designed to
prevent a suitor from engaging in a proxy contest (which is
part of the usual strategy for a hostile acquisition) to
remove an incumbent board of directors and then have the
new board amend or redeem the shareholder rights plan as a
precursor to an unfriendly acquisition. These provisions
are known as "dead hand" provisions because they prevent
the redemption or amendment of rights plans if there are no
continuing directors and thus provide a powerful tool for a
company in fending off a coercive or unwanted takeover
proposal
.
34
Poison pills containing continuing directors
provisions thus have vast potential to hinder proxy
contests, as well as to block hostile tender offers. The
interests of the board may, as a result, conflict with
those of shareholders when the former, responding to a
control threat, adopts such a pill. Numerous commentators
33 139 Misc. 2d at 667, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 483
34
. Lipin, "Big B' s Unusual Poison Pill sparks Lawsuit by Hostile
Suitor Revco," Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1996, at B4 ; see Block, Hoff &
Cochran, "Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to
Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 623, 644 (Apr.
1997) .
17
have sought the invalidation of pills like this that
encroach on shareholder voting rights. Companies that have
adopted continuing director provisions argue that they are
a reasonable response to the possibility that a hostile
bidder may attempt to circumvent a target's rights plan by
conducting a proxy contest aimed at replacing the target's
board with directors who will then redeem the rights in
order to facilitate a self-dealing or unfair transaction.
C. The Impact of the Poison Pill in Corporate Takeover
Proponents of poison pill plans argue that
shareholder right plans give a target corporation' s board
of directors the power to protect shareholders from the
potentially coercive tactics of a hostile bidder. Although
every shareholder might consider the bidder' s offering
price inadequate, a two-tiered offer will coerce all
shareholders to tender at a lower price. 36
. Moran, 500 A. 2d at 1349 (Lipton discussing the frequency of "bust-
up" takeovers as a justification for the adoption of a pill) . See also
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 635 F.Supp. 1174, 1178
(N . D . Ill . 1986) (discussing the "threat" or "evil" poised by squeeze-out
mergers )
.
36
. Prentice describes this coercion as follows:
The effect of front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers is to
"stampede" target shareholders into a decision to tender. The "whipsaw"
effect is created by the "prisoner's dilemma." Although every
shareholder may believe that the bid is too low and the wiser course
would be to hold out for a higher bid, an inability to act
cooperatively forces each shareholder to tender out of fear that if he
does not tender, -his fellow shareholders will, leaving his stuck with
18
To combat this perceived coercion, poison pills
were developed, a move which courts and commentators have
supported despite the risk that the pill will entrench
management. 3 Courts have sanctioned poison pills as a
legitimate defensive device to mitigate the coercive force
of two-tiered tender offer; 31 and commentators have
contended that the unfairness of two-tiered tender offers
is the only justification for a target company's use of a
poison pill. 39
the lower back-end merger price.
Prentice, supra note 61, at 442 (footnotes omitted).
. See Prentice, supra note 61, at 412 ("one of the main purpose of
poison pills is to deter front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offer."); Affidavit of John C. Coffee, Jr. at P 11, Big B, Inc. v.
Revco D.S., Inc. (N.D. Ala. Filed 1996) ("The actual intent [of a
poison pill] was probably to employ it to deter two tier offers 0.")
.
Poison pills were developed with the intention of assuring equality
among shareholders. Rather than serving as a tool to block takeovers,
the pill was intended to allow back-end shareholders the same deal
presented to front-end shareholders. Another arguably plausible
justification for the "flip-in" variety of poison pill is that it
prevents "creeping" acquisitions, and thereby the possibility that the
aquiror will steal the shareholder' s "control premium" by purchasing
shares secretly and silently in the open market. See id. At P 14. In
such a situation, the pill forces the acquiror to negotiate with the
target board of directors. See id.
38
. See, e.g., Desert Partners v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp . 1289, 1295-
300 (N.D. 111. 1988) (validating use of rights plan against unsolicited
front-end loaded, two-tiered bid); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep'
t
Stores, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 93,680,
at 98,118-21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1988) (same); Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (identifying as threat posed for
purposes of Unocal test, "the threat in the market place of coercive
two-tier tender offers").
See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered
Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1964, 1971-72
(1984); see also Prentice, supra note 61, at 412 ("Commentators have
argued that [poison pills] can only be justified if they are used to
19
In addition to discouraging front-end loaded and
partial tender offers, the pills deter large shareholders
from engaging in self-dealing transactions. 41 Supporters of
the shareholder rights plans also contend that the plans
force an acquiror to negotiate the terms of a business
combination with the target board. Moreover, some scholars
argued that the pills furnish target directors and
management with the bargaining power necessary to force
raiders to pay substantially higher premiums for the
target's stock. 41The empirical studies conducted by New York
proxy solicitor Georgeson & Co. confirmed, the belief that
poison pills enacted by directors help maximize shareholder
wealth in hostile bidding contest.
A study released by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center criticized the defensive tactics in general
and poison pill plans in particular because: (1) it
transfers power from stockholders to directors and
interfere with voting contests, (2) entrenches management,
defeat front-end loaded, two tiered bids.") .
Examples of self-dealing include: reducing dividends, selling
assets to affiliates on terms less favorable than the target could have
obtained in arm's-length negotiations, increasing compensation levels
for the acquiror, and recapitalizing or reclassifying the target's
stock to increase the proportionate interest of the acquiror. Dawson,
Pence & Stone, supra note 14, at 428 (1987).
41
. Lee, Poison Pills Benefit Shareholders by Forcing Raiders to Pay
more for Targets, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 55, Cols. 2, 3 (quoting
Martin Lipton stating that the poison pill is the most effective way to
20
(3) precludes all takeovers, and (4) decreases shareholders
wealth. 42
equalize the negotiating strength of management with the overwhelming
advantage that the corporate raider has)
.
Institutional Investors Oppose Poison Pill Plans, IRRC Survey
Shows, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.Rep. (BNA) No. 46 at 1751-52 (Nov. 20, 1987).
II. Judicial Review of Incumbents' Use of Poison Pill
A. The Traditional Business Judgment Rule
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule
flows from the fundamental principle that the business and
affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under
its board of directors. 43 The rule has often been
characterized in its application as a rebuttable
presumption of management good faith.
Generally, the protection of the business judgment
rule applied only to disinterested directors. In addition,
to invoke the rule's protection, directors have a duty to
inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of
any reasonably available information that is material to
the transaction, and by acting with requisite care in the
discharge of their duties. Normally, where the business
judgment rule applies, liability of directors for breach of
the duty of care will only exist if the directors are found
to have been grossly negligent. 44
43
. Polk v. Good, 507 A. 2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A. 2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A. 2d 619 (Del.
1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
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The courts have modified the presumption of the
basic business judgment rule in tender offer situations,
since tender offern threates the directors' control of
management positions in the corporation. In Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. 45 , the Delaware Supreme Court first
articulated the duties of a corporate baord faced with a
hostile tender offer. Mesa, which owned thirteen percent of
Unocal's stock, made a two-tired "front-loaded" cash tender
offer for thirty-seven percent of Unocal's outstanding
stock. 46 After gaining control of the corporation, Mesa
intended to buy out the remaining shareholders using highly
subordinated securities, commonly called "junk bonds." 4
Unocal's board, which had a majority of disinterested
directors, determined that Mesa's tender offer was
inadequate and adopted a self tender plan in order to give
Unocal shareholders what they believed to be an adequate
alternative to Mesa's offer. 48 The self tender plan provided
that if Mesa were successful in its tender offer, Unocal
would buy the remaining outstanding shares for an exchange
44
. Van Gorkom at 873; Aronson at 812.
45
. 493 A. 2d 946 (Del. 1985) .
46
. Id. At 949. Mesa offered $54.00 per shares tendered in the first
tier of its offer. Id.
47
. Id. At 949-50. The junk bonds had an estimated value of $54.00 per
share. Id.
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of debt securities. The exchange was designed to ensure
that shareholders who did not tender to Mesa at the front
end of the tender offer would be adequately compensated at
the back end of the offer. 49 The resolution specifically
excluded Mesa from participating in the exchange. 5 '
Evaluating the board's decision to adopt the exchange plan,
the Delaware court noted that "because of the omnipresent
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty ... before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred." 51 The Delaware Supreme Court adopted a two-prong
test which must be satisfied before the board' s decisions
in the takeover context are protected by the business
judgment rule. First, the board must show that it had
^reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed.' 5 This burden
48
. Id. At 950-51.
49
. Id.
Id. Including Mesa in the exchange plan would have defeated the
plan's purpose, because under the pro rata provision of the plan, some
Mesa shares tendered would have to be accepted, thereby excluding other
shareholders. Id. Thus, including Mesa would have in effect forced
Unocal to partially finance Mesa's tender offer. Mesa argued that the
exclusion violated the board's fiduciary duty to it as a shareholder.
Id. At 953, 957.
bl
. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 946 Del. 1985).
Id. at 955. The first prong of the Unocal test ensures that a
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is satisfied by a showing of "good faith and reasonable
investigation.' 55 Second, the board's defensive measure must
be ^reasonable in relation to the threat posed.' 5 Although
Unocal did not involve a poison pill situation, the case is
important, however, because it imposed on the Unocal board
the initial burden of proving the reasonableness of its
decision to oppose a takeover bid. 51 The Unocal court
modified the basic or traditional judgment rule by shifting
the initial burden to the board. By allowing a court to
examine the reasonableness of a board' s adoption of a
defensive tactic, Unocal cleared the way for judicial
intervention in takeover cases.
defensive measure designed to prevent a takeover is motivated by a good
faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its shareholders.
See id. The court listed examples of concerns which a board might have
in analyzing the nature of a bid including: (a) inadequacy of the price
offered; (b) nature and timing of the offer; (c) questions of
illegality; (d) the impact on constituencies other than shareholders;
(e) the risk of nonconsummation; and (f) the quality of the securities
being offered in an exchange. See id. Unocal also states that a finding
that the first prong is satisfied will be materially enhanced if the
defensive measure was approved by a majority of the outside independent
directors. See id. The importance of a vote of independent directors
was taken from an earlier Delaware case. See Puma v. Marriott, 283 A. 2d
693, 695 (Del. Ch . 1971) .
53
. See Unocal, 493 A. 2d at 955.
54
. Id. at 955. The second prong adds an element of balance by
requiring that the board analyze the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporation. Because of the balancing requirement, the
test is sometimes referred to as the proportionality test. See TW
Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sel. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,174 (Del. Ch . Mar. 2, 1989).
55
. Id. at 955.
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Judicial standards for implementing the Unocal
test in the directorial defensive action context have
oscillated dramatically in recent years. In Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 56 the court considered,
among other things, a number of subjective and intangible
elements in determining whether the Time board satisfied
Unocal's reguirements in responding to a hostile tender
offer by Paramount Communications . This case involved an
attempt by Paramount to acguire Time in a cash tender
offer, interfering with a proposed friendly merger between
Time and Warner Communications. In response to the
Paramount bid, the Time board recast the proposed Warner
merger into an acguisition of Time by Warner, and refused
to redeem its shareholder rights plan. The Delaware
Supreme Court expanded in two directions the powers of a
target company's board to reject a hostile tender. First,
it greatly expanded the list of potential threats that a
board could consider under the first prong of Unocal. 5 In
addition to considering the financial inadequacy of
Paramount' s unsolicited offer, the court allowed Time, the
target, to argue that Paramount' s offer was inconsistent
with Time' s long-term business strategy, involved a
56
. 571 A. 2d 1140 (Del. 11989).
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significant degree of uncertainty that skewed a comparative
analysis, was designed to confuse or upset the
shareholders' vote on a proposed merger with a competing
bidder (Warner) , and did not provide the best strategic fit
with Time's policy and culture. Second, it shifted the
standard for judicial review of the directors'
determination that a threat exists away from the
independent judicial determination emphasized by prior
chancery court decisions and toward a more lenient business
judgment type standard. In short, Time seems to mark the
collapse of heightened judicial scrutiny for takeover
defensive tactics against hostile tender offers and a
retreat to their deferential review under the business
judgment rule. 58
Despite this apparent momentum in favor of target
board of directors, Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc. 5 ' reverted back to what could be viewed as a
"more shareholder-friendly standard." 6 ' In this case, the
57
. Id. at 1942.
. Id. at 1945-47. In other words, the Delaware Supreme Court "seems
to have abandoned the effort to subject defensive tactics in hostile
takeovers to serious scrutiny, backing away from several recent
precedents and undermining a sophisticated developing jurisprudence in
the Chancery Court." Id. at 1947.
59
. 637 A. 2d 34 (Del. 1993) .
Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yahlon, Delaware Fiduciary
Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of
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lock-up option at issue gave Viacom, a third corporation,
the right to purchase ilmost 20 percent of Paramount stock
for approximately $1.6 billion, which Viacom could opt to
pay with a subordinated note instead of cash. Additionally,
the lock-up option contained a put provision that permitted
Viacom to require Paramount' s stock at the time the option
was triggered, with no cap limiting the maximum dollar
value of the put. The court enjoined the lock-up on the
grounds that the note and put provisions were potentially
draconian to Paramount and unusually and highly beneficial
to Viacom. The court reasoned that the Paramount board's
primary obligation was to use its informed judgment for the
"realization of the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders." 61 To ensure that boards satisfy this
requirement, courts must subject the boards' actions to
"enhanced judicial scrutiny" whenever an extraordinary
corporate transaction occurs. Conversely, Unitrin, Inc. v.
American General Corp., 3 restrained the reach of QVC's
enhanced judicial scrutiny standard. In this case, the
Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. Law. 1593 (1994); see also Cede & Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A. 2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (subjecting board action in
takeover scenario to judicial scrutiny under "entire fairness" standard
of review)
.
61
. Id. at 51.
62
. Id. at 45.
63
. 651 A. 2d 1361 (Del. 1995)
.
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Delaware Chancery Court upheld a shareholder right plan,
but preliminarily enjoined a repurchase program implemented
by Unitrin, the target of a hostile takeover offer by
American General Corporation. The Delaware Supreme Court
overruled the Chancery Court's determination that the
target board' s actions in defending against a hostile
tender offer 64 were "unnecessary" and therefore
"disproportionate" under the second prong of the Unocal
test. 65 The Unitrin Court stated that "a court applying
enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect
decision." 66 The court indicated that any defensive
maneuvers fall outside the range of reasonableness if it
can be characterized as "draconian," by which the court
meant to signify "preclusive or coercive." Thus, after
64
. In response to American General's (the bidder) tender offer for the
stock of Unitrin (the target), the Unitrin board adopted a poison pill
and commenced a stock repurchase program. See id. at 1370-71.
Id. at 1385 ("The Court of Chancery applied an incorrect legal
standard when it ruled that the Unitrin decision to authorize the
Repurchase Program was disproportionate because it was unnecessary.").
66 Id.
Id. at 1387. The court stated that "defensive measures which are
either preclusive or coercive are included within the common law
definition of draconian." According to the court, a defensive action is
"preclusive" if it deprives "the stockholders of their rights to
receive tender offers [or] fundamentally restricts proxy contests." Id.
A defensive act is "coercive" if it is "aimed at ^cramming down' on ...
shareholders a management-sponsored alternative." Id. The court's
rationale for this standard is as follows: The ratio decidendi for the
"range of reasonableness" standard is a need of the board of directors
29
Unitrin, a defensive action that can be characterized as
preclusive or coercive will fail the second prong of the
Unocal test
.
The Delaware Chancery Court in Blasius Industries
v. Atlas Corp. 68 stated what some scholars consider to be
the "most important contemporary articulation of the
judicial franchise." In that case, Blasius was a new
stockholder of Atlas who had accumulated over nine percent
of Atlas' common stock within four months; Blasius then
subsequently recommended that Atlas restructure the
company, amend its bylaws to increase the size of its board
and fill the new directorships with Blasius' nominees. 7 ' The
board viewed Blasius' action as an attempt to takeover the
company. 7 The board then amended the corporation's bylaws
to change the date of the shareholders' meeting, increased
the size of its board from seven to nine and filled the two
new positions with nominees friendly to the inccumbent
for latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation and
its shareholders when defending against perceived threats. The
concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint. Consequently, if the
board of directors' defensive response is not draconian (preclusive or
coercive) and is within a "range of reasonableness," a court must not
substitute its judgment for the board's. Id. at 1388.
68
. 564 A. 2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
69
. Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of Judicial
Review of Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 Bus. Law. 647, 654
(1992) .
70
. See Blasius, 564 A. 2d at 653-54.
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board. 7. In reviewing these board actions, the court
recognized that the directors acted to protect the company
and its stockholders from what they, in good faith,
believed was an unwise and potentially harmful consent
solicitation proposed by a shareholder. 7 The court
determined that it must provide "closer scrutiny" of the
board' s action than would be provided under the Unocal test
because the board' s action was designed primarily to
interfere with shareholder franchise. 74 Although the Blasius
distinguished its own test from that of Unocal, later cases
treated the Blasius standard as a "specific expression" of
the Unocal test. 75
11
. id.
72
. Id. (discussing board's emergency decision to expand number of
directors by amending bylaws). Although there was a scheduled meeting
within a week, the board called an emergency meeting in order to add
additional directors. See id. Evidence suggested, and the court
concluded, that the board was motivated to preclude the holders of a
majority of the company's shares from placing a majority of new
directors on the board through Blasius' consent solicitation. See id.
at 656 (concluding that board immediately endorsed persons for board in
order to preclude majority of shareholders from electing new board
members selected by Blasius)
.
73
. See id. at 663 (noting that board entitled to take steps to evade
perceived risk)
.
74
. Id. at 659.
75
. Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A. 2d 278, 285-86 (Del. Ch.
1989); See e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A. 2d 75, 92 n.3 (Del. 1992) ("We
note that the two ^tests' are not mutually exclusive because both
recognize the inherent conflicts of interest that arise when
shareholders are not permitted free exercise of their franchise.");
Apple Bancorp, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
97,036 (concluding that Blasius and Unocal standards are "structurally
similar and may ... be functionally similar as well") . Although "many
of the litigants and the courts . . . have treated the Blasius standard
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Although the decisions demonstrate the unsettled
state of the law governing boards' defensive actions, one
thing is clear: the trend is toward relaxing the applicable
level of scrutiny used to ensure that target company boards
properly exercise their fiduciary duties with respect to
tender offers
.
B. Judicial Review of Poison Pill
In Moran v. Household International, Inc. 76 , a
substantial shareholder of the company who was not actively
engaged in an effort to acquire the company challenged the
validity of Household International' s Rights Plan, one of
the first Rights Plan put into place. Plaintiffs contended
that the Rights Plan, which resulted in the issuance of
what they call a "poison pill preferred, " abridged
fundamental rights of stock ownership by restricting the
alienability and marketability of Household shares and
severely limited the ability of shareholders to engage in
as requiring a more searching and critical judicial inquiry than the
Unocal framework," commentators, as well as Delaware courts, have
recognized the "Blasius may be viewed as a reformulation and not
necessarily an extension of Unicoi in the context of stockholder voting
rights." Warren & Abrams, supra note , at 669. Such commentators
reason the "by inquiring into both the incumbent directors' motives and
the practical effect of their tactics on the insurgents' proxy or
consent solicitation, Blasius parallels the two-prong Unocal inquiry
into the target directors' reasonable perception of a threat to a valid
corporate interest, and the proportionality of their response to the
threat." Id.
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proxy contests. Household maintained that the Rights Plan
provided a drastic but highly effective deterrent device
designed to prevent hostile, bust-up takeovers, for the
protection of both the corporation and its shareholders.
In this case, the Delaware Court extended for the first
time the application of the business judgment rule to the
adoption of a flip-over poison pill in the absence of a
specific threat of takeover. Relying extensively on its
decision in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that the reasonableness of a defensive mechanism is
materially enhanced where a majority of the board approving
it consists of outside independent directors who have
developed a good-faith belief through reasonable
investigation that a danger to the corporation exists. 7. The
court conclusively declared that the adoption of poison
pill rights plan was within a board of director's power, 7
and held that the business judgment rule was the applicable
standard to review the board' s adoption of the poison
pill. 80
76
. 490 A. 2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985).
79
. Moran at 1351. In other jurisdictions, poison pill rights plans
continuing flip-over provision have been declared invalid. See e.g.
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. UL Inds., 644 F.Supp. 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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When the modified business judgment standards were
applied to the Moran facts, the court found that
Household's Board of Directors was entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule. The board met
their initial burden of a good faith in the plan adopted to
protect the company from coercive takeover tactics and that
the plan was reasonable in relation to the threat posed due
to the board' s awareness of several merger overtures by
other companies, and the increased frequency of bust-up and
two-tier tender offers. 81
The Delaware court then opened the door of the
current redemption litigation by shifting the emphasis from
the adoption of the plan to its implementation. The court
stated that the ultimate response to an actual takeover bid
will be judged by the board at the time and the actual use
of the rights plan when and if the issue arose.
After Moran, the Delaware Chancery Court in City
Capital Associates v. Interco Inc. 8, clarified the duty to
auction first announced in Revlon. Interco involved two
81
. Moran at 1356-57 (citing Van Gorkom at 873) (concluding the
Household Board had made an informed decision after reasonable
investigation)
.
. C.A. No. 10105 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 19
. MacAndres & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
(Del. Ch. 1985) (Walsh, J.) aff'd, 506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986). Revlon had
v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A. 2d 1239
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questions: (1) whether Interco's board of directors in
refusing to redeem a poison pill was breaching their
fiduciary duties to stockholders under Unocal and Moran; 8 '
and (2) whether the implementation of a restructuring plan
constituted a violation of the board' s fiduciary duty under
Unocal and Revlon. 85 The Interco court concluded that the
poison pill plan was not a reasonable response to the
threat to Interco from City Capital Associates' (CCA)
noncoercive offer. 86 The court upheld the restructuring
plan, however, on the theory that it constituted a
reasonable response to an offering price perceived by
Interco's board to be ^inadequate .
'
87
given a lockup option on its health divisions to Fortmann Litte & Co.
in the face of a hostile takeover attempt by Pantry Pride. The Court
stated that once the sale was inevitable, x the duty of the board . . .
had changed from the preservation of Revon as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's calue at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit.' Id. at 182.
8
*
. Interco, C.A. No. 10105, slip op. at 1-2.
86
. Id. at 4. The fact that CCA' s offer was a cash offer for all
shares, and thus noncoercive, seemed to weigh heavily in the court's
decision to enjoin Interco's pill. The Interco court ruled that Unocal
and Moran supply the appropriate legal framework for evaluating the
adoption of a defensive tactic in the hostile takeover context. In
addition, the court distinguished Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A. 2d 1334 (Del. 1987), which placed on the board of
directors the burden of proving the entire fairness of keeping a pill
in place while implementing a recapitalization, as only applying to
situations where a board has engaged in self-dealing. Interco, C.A. No.
10105, slip op. at 3.
87
. Id. at 4.
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The board of the target of a hostile takeover
attempt may refuse to redeem an intact rights plan without
offering its shareholders an economic alternative to
tendering (the "just say no" defense) . The most recent
judicial pronouncement on the issue of a board's obligation
to redeem a shareholder rights plan is Moore Corp. Limited
v. Wallance Computer Services, Inc., 8 where the court
affirmed the ability of a target to "just say no" to a
hostile takeover attempt in some circumstances.
Wallace affirmed the availability of the "Just Say
No" defense by holding the target board's refusal to
redeem a shareholder rights plan when the board failed to
offer an economic alternative to the hostile tender offer.
The court found that the board' s refusal to redeem the
shareholder rights plan satisfied the Unocal test. First,
the court found that Moore's offer was inadequate,
noncoercive tender offer can constitute a threat under
Unocal not only when the target needs additional time to
organize a suitable alternative to the tender offer, but,
significantly, also when shareholders might tender their
shares without a complete understanding of the economic
value of the target's business strategy.
36
The court went on to find that the board' s refusal
to redeem the shareholder rights plan was "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed" because it was neither
preclusive nor coercive. Wallace further indicates that if
a target demonstrates present financial success, courts
will be more likely to presume that the board's long term
business strategy is to the shareholders' best interests
and uphold a refusal to redeem a shareholder rights plan,
not withstanding shareholders' positive response to an
unsolicited bid.
A recent chancery court case, In re Gaylord
Container Corp. Shareholders Litigation 89 supports the view
that proportionality review should take into account the
cumulative effects of target defense measures and the
distribution of share ownership. In light of shark
repellent bylaw and charter amendments compounded by 20%
stock ownership by corporate insiders, a poison pill could
well have an illegitimate preclusive effect, the court
said. "[T]he board's unilateral adoption of the shareholder
rights plan is subject to enhanced scrutiny, and that
88
. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
89
. C.A. No. 14616, 1996 WL 752356 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1996).
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scrutiny must consider the effect of the rights plan in
combination with the amendments." 9 '
The case law regarding the board's obligation to
redeem rights plans essentially follows the logic of the
Delaware courts' sale of control/non-control transaction
case law, as well as the basic Unocal standard. Thus, a
board engaged in the sale of control of the company may not
apply a rights plan, including to favor a preferred
strategic merger, as part of a business strategy to remain
independent
.
C. Judicial Review of Dead Hand Provisions In Poison Pill
1. Bank of New York and Invacare Decisions
The first court to address the validity of a dead-
hand provisions was the New York Supreme Court, in Bank of
New York. 1 Construing New York law, the court enjoined
enforcement of a such a provision.
The case arose from a tender offer by the Bank of
New York, or BNY, for all of the outstanding shares of
Irving Bank Corp., or IBC. In response to the tender offer,
90 Id. at *3.
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IBC s board of directors adopted a shareholder rights plan
which provided that those rights could be redeemed by the
board before the time the acquiring person or entity
obtained ownership or control of 10 percent or more of
IBC's stock.
BNY responded to IBC s rights plan by commencing a
proxy contest seeking to replace the IBC board with
directors who, if elected, would redeem the shareholder
rights, paving the way for the consummation of BNY' s tender
offer. 9 ' To counter that response, IBC adopted an amendment
to its shareholder rights plan containing a dead-hand
provision . 93
The court addressed the validity of the dead-hand
provision under the New York Business Corporation Law, Sec.
620 (b)
,
which provides that any restriction on the powers
of the board of directors to manage the corporation must be
set forth in the company's certificate of incorporation. 94
IBC's board of directors had neither sought nor obtained
shareholder approval for its continuing director provision
and the court held that in the absence of such approval,
91
. 139 Misc. 2d, at 665, 528 N.Y.S. 2d 482.
92
. Id. at 665, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 483.
93
. Id. at 667, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 483.
91
. Id. at 670-71, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 485 (citing N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
sees. 620, 701, 708)
.
$9
IBC s board of directors was without statutory authority to
adopt a continuing director provision since it had
selectively restricted future board members from managing
the affairs of the company. 95
The court also recognized that the existence of
the dead-hand provision was likely to cause BNY
"irreparable harm" insofar as the mere existence of the
provision would likely taint the outcome of the proxy
contest. 96 The court reasoned that shareholders might not
vote for the insurgent slate knowing that if elected, it
would not (if it did not receive more than 66 percent of
the shareholder vote) 9 have the power to redeem the rights
(and that perhaps their election might make it impossible
to accept any offer to sell the company) . 9I
However, in 1997, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, in Invacare Corp. v.
95 Id. at 671, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 486
96
. Id. at 669, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 484.
Pursuant to the dead-hand provision adopted by IBC, the company'
s
board can redeem the rights only if the board (1) consists of a
majority of continuing directors; (2) does not consist of a majority of
continuing directors, but the new directors were elected by affirmative
vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of
the company; or (3) does not consist of a majority of continuing
directors, but in connection with the election of the directors who are
not continuing directors no merger consolidation or similar transaction
was proposed with respect to IBC. Id. at 667, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 483.
98
. Id. at 668-69, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 484.
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Healthdyne Technologies Inc., 9 refused to enjoin a
"continuing directors" provision contained in a shareholder
rights plan adopted by Healthdyne Technologies Inc., a
Georgia corporation.
2. Toll Brother and Quickturn Decisions
The Delaware courts addressed dead hand rights
plan provisions for the first time during the summer of
1998 in Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc. 11 Vice Chancellor
Jack B. Jacobs denied a motion to dismiss claims alleging
that the adoption of a dead hand provision by Toll
Brothers, Inc. violated Delaware statutory law and
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. He said the dead
hand poison pill is intended to thwart hostile bids by
vesting shareholders with preclusive rights that cannot be
redeemed excepted by the Continuing Directors. Thus, even
replacing the entire board, which is practically possible
to redeem the pill, is legally impossible to achieve that
goal. Based on these grounds, the court held, "the
complaint states claims under Delaware law upon which
relief can be granted." However, the court also noted that
condemning the dead hand provision that remains effective
968 F.Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga . 1997
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for the life of the pill did not involve the validity of a
provision of limited variation, and cautioned that
"nothing in this opinion should be read as expressing a
view or pronouncement" concerning " Mead hand' provisions
of limited duration (e.g., six months) ." 1(
A short time later, Vice Chancellor Jacobs was
faced with the issue he had left open in Toll Brothers 102 : a
rights plan precluding redemption only for a six-month
period. The plan in this case was adopted by Quickturn
Design Systems, Inc., the target of an unwanted bid by
Mentor Graphics Corporation, less than one month after Toll
Brothers was decided.
At the time Mentor commenced its bid, Quickturn
had in place a dead hand rights plan. After determining
that Mentor's offer was inadequate, Quickturn' s board
replaced the plan' s dead hand feature with a no hand
delayed redemption provision. The new plan provided that if
a majority of Quickturn' s directors were replaced by
shareholder action, then for six months no directors could
redeem the rights "if such redemption is reasonably likely
100
. 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131 (Del. Ch . July 24, 1998).
101
. Id. at [FN29] -50 & 50 n. 52.
102
. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corporation, 721
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to have the purpose or effect of facilitating a Transaction
with an Interested Person." 103
According to the Unocal test, the Court of
Chancery first found that Quickturn' s board reasonably
perceived a cognizable threat presented by Mentor's offer.
The Board believed Quickturn shareholders might mistakenly
ignore Quickturn' s true value, accept Mentor's inadequate
offer, and elect a new board that would prematurely sell
the company before the new board could adequately inform
itself of Quickturn' s fair value and before the
shareholders could consider other options." 104
After the Chancery Court found the Board satisfied
the first prong of the Unocal test, the Court went to the
second prong of the Unocal test. The Court of Chancery
found that Quickturn' s no hand provision was a
disproportionate response to the threat the board
perceived
.
The Supreme Court affirmed on an alternative
ground: Sec. 141 (a) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law -- one of the sources, according to the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Household
A. 2d 1281 (1998)
.
103
. Id., at 1287
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International, Inc., 101 of a board's authority to enact
rights plans. 106
The Supreme Court in Quickturn stated that the
concept that the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a
corporation is one of the most basic tenats of Delaware
corporate law. The business and affairs of every
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in
1 D7its certificate of incorporation. Quickturn'
s
certificate of incorporation, the court stated, "contains
no provision purporting to limit the authority of the board
in any way
.
"
The court accordingly held that Quickturn' s rights
plan was invalid under Section 141(a), because the plan
prevented a newly elected board of directors from
completely discharging its fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its stockholders for six months. The court
acknowledged that this suspension of the rights plan
"limits the board of directors' authority in only one
105
. 500 A. 2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
106
. Quickturn, slip op. at 27; Household, 500 A. 2d at 1353.
107
. Id.
108
. Quickturn, slip op. at 28-29 & n. 37.
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respect" but stated that it "restricts the board's power in
en area of fundamental importance to the shareholders--
negotiating a possible sale of the corporation." 1 '
The court concluded, the delayed redemption
provision "would prevent a new Quickturn board of directors
from managing the corporation by redeeming the Rights Plan
to facilitate a transaction that would serve the
stockholders' best interests, even under circumstances
where the board would be required to do so because of its
fiduciary duty to the Quickturn stockholders." 1 The
provision thus "impermissibly circumscribes the board's
statutory power under Section 141 (a) and the directors'
ability to fulfill their concomitant fiduciary duties."
The Supreme Court's decision in Quickturn directly
involved a no hand delayed redemption rights plan, but the
court's reasoning makes clear that all types of dead hand
and no hand poison pill rights plans now are prohibited in
Delaware. The extent to which other states follow the lead
of Delaware in Quickturn and New York in Bank of New York
-- or the lead of Georgia in Healthdyne and Pennsylvania in
AMP -- remains to be seen.
109
. Id. at 29.
III. Abuses of the Poison Pill,
Shareholder Choice, and By-Law Restrictions
A. Abuses of the Poison Pill
The market for corporate control works to identify
weak managers and inhibits at least some agency-cost
problems in the firm. Poison pills can prevent a change in
management when extended long enough to keep the costs of a
takeover prohibitively high until potential bidders lose
interest altogether. Thus, by refusing to redeem a pill, a
board can eliminate the firm as a profitable commodity in
the takeover market, thereby retaining the status quo in
which they maintain control. As a result, not only will the
pill possibly prevent shareholders from gaining from a
higher price for shares offered by the bidder, inefficient
management may not be replaced. Furthermore, the monitoring
function served by the market for corporate control is
dealt a serious blow because potential acquirers are
deterred from tendering an initial offer in the first place
because the pill makes the cost of acquisition artificially
(and prohibitively) high. Thus, less information is
45
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gathered and transmitted in the market about poorly
functioning managers and less replacement also results.
The poison pill is open to abuse because it is an
effective entrenchment tool, especially when coupled with
the low probability of judicial invalidation of the pill. 1
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the poison pill is an
important tool for raising shareholder value. Thus, finding
ways to keep the pill but curb the abuse should be of
critical importance to the development of efficient
corporate governance mechanisms.
B. By-Law Restrictions on Poison Pills
Initially, attempts to defeat poison pills
entrenchment effects unsuccessfully challenged the validity
of the pill. 112 Subsequently efforts to overcome the pill
centered around proxy contests. 11 The problem with this
tactic, of course, is that many companies have staggered
111
. See Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of
Judicial Review of Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 Bus. Law.
647, 647 (1991) (outlining the various legal factors that have
strengthened the authority of boards to defend against hostile
takeovers )
.
112
. See Moran, 500 A. 2d at 1356 (validating the board of directors' use
of a poison pill, even where no hostile takeover was present or
threaten at the time of adoption)
.
113
. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand
Pills, and Shareholder Adopted Bylaws: An Essay For Warren Buffet,
Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 522-23 (1997) (describing the board's power to use
a poison pill to block hostile acguirers who combine a tender offer
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elections for their boards of directors. 1 A staggered
board can deter a tender offer coupled with a proxy contest
because of the length of time required to take control of
such a board. 115 Control of a staggered board usually cannot
be obtained for two to three years. 116 The uncertainty and
expense created by having to wait two to three years to
obtain control of the board effectively deters many
potential hostile bidders. 117 Thus, shareholders may be
prevented from getting a premium for their shares. 1
In response to this reality, shareholders and
tender offerors alike began searching for a solution. 1
Their solution takes the form of mandatory by-laws
prohibiting the adoption of poison pills or requiring the
redemption of existing poison pills. 120
with a proxy contest); see also Thomas, supra note , at 509
114
. See id. at 529.
115
. See id,
117
. See id.
118
. See id.
119
. See Lawrence A Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-
Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409, 414-16
(1998). This solution has again touched off the debate about the proper
allocation of corporate power between shareholders and boards of
directors. Id.
120 See id.
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The structure of the shareholder rights bylaw is
exemplified by the proposal of Guy P. Wyser-Pratte to the
shareholders of Pennzoil. 121 The proposal resulted after
Pennzoil received a tender offer from Union Pacific
Resources Group Inc. The Pennzoil board used the poison
pill to "just say no" to the offer, maintaining the pill
for an extended period of time until the offer eventually
terminated. 12 ' Wyser-Pratte' s proposal applies when there is
an offer to purchase one hundred percent of common stock at
twenty-five percent premium over the market price. 1. It
would cause the board of directors to cease using a poison
pill to block an offer after ninety days unless the
shareholders approve continued use of the pill to block the
offer. 124
Thus, by providing an automatic review by the
shareholders of a poison pill, bidders will be more
confident that management will be unable to entrench itself
in conflict with shareholder interests. Fewer bidders will
121
. See Jonathan R. Macey, Manager's Journal: A Poison Pill That
Shareholders Can Swallow, Wall St. J., May 4, 1998, at A22.
122
. See id.
123
. See id.
124
. See id.; see also Seth Goodchild & Daniel J. Buzzetta, Shareholder
Rights By-Law Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 30, 1997, at 5 (describing a
similar proposal to the shareholders of Wallace Computer Services
Inc. )
.
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be deterred from tendering an offer. Therefore, the ninety
day time limit allows the shareholders to reap the benefits
of the poison pill -- by avoiding the "prisoner's dilemma"
and by buying time to negotiate an even better bid -- while
preventing the board from using the pill as an entrenchment
technique. The ability to approve continued use of the pill
enables the shareholders to either buy more time or to push
away a bidder that they believe is truly adverse to their
best interests.
IV. Implications for an Emerging Market like China
In the past twenty years, the Chinese government has
been adopting open door and economic reform policies.
Because of historical, economic, legal, and culture
traditions, a modern corporation system is far form being
established in China. There are lots of things that need to
do to establish a perfect corporate system.
A. Clarify the State as a Shareholder's
Role in Corporate Management
For many State owned enterprise, the big problem
in the process of transition into a modern corporation is
how to deal with the relationship between the state and the
corporation itself. Under present Chinese Corporate Law, as
a prerequisite to receiving corporate status, enterprises
must adopt an internal governance structure comprised of
shareholders, a board of directors (or a general manager
for smaller concerns), and a supervisory committee. 125 The
. See the Corporate Law of the People's Republic of China, at art.
51. For an English version of the Corporate Law of the People's
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corporation's investors, at a shareholders' meeting,
appoint a board of directors for management purposes and,
together with labor, designate a supervisory committee for
internal corporate monitoring. 12 ' By permitting the state to
exercise an ownership and shareholder position in a
corporation with state-owned assets and the right to
safeguard the socialist market economy, culture and ethics,
the Corporate Law invites conflict between corporate (and
their investors) and the state. This conflict is
institutionalized into a system of corporate governance
that grants board powers to shareholders (like the state),
while concurrently legislating collaboration among
shareholders, managers and labor, and subjecting
corporations government and public supervision
In promoting strong, more autonomous enterprises,
China's system of corporate governance purports to create
boundaries between state ownership and enterprise
management. Yet the state's position as a shareholder and
owner in companies with state-owned assets, coupled with
its supervision powers, undermines the notion of enterprise
Republic of China (PRC) (passed at the 5th Session of the Standing
Committee of the 8th National People's Congress (NPC) ; adopted Dec. 29,
1993 by the 8th NPC; effective as of July 1, 19994) [hereinafter
"Corporate Law"]; see CHINA ECONOMIC NEWS, Mar. 7, 1994, at Supplement
No. 2.
. See Corporate Law, supra note 199, at art. 104 (requiring an annual
meeting in addition to interim shareholder meetings)
.
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autonomy. Consequently, it remains unclear how enterprises
under corporate law will operate: whether like the
businesses found in the private sector or like state
enterprises under the government's direct control and
ownership
.
Clarification of the state' s role in enterprise
management is essential for potential private foreign and
domestic investors, given their concern over the risks of
state intervention and, especially, of the Party's
influence over governmental economic, social and political
policies. In order to increase the efficiency of state
owned corporations, the state must stop governmental
interference with corporation. The only way that state can
dominate corporate is shareholder action. State can
exercise majority voting control and dominate the
corporation
.
B. Establish a Market for Corporate Control
In economic terms, the judicial tradition of wide
deference to the decisions of a board of directors can be
justified by the existence of certain markets that
constrain inefficient management performance without
incurring the enormous transaction costs involved with
53
litigation. 12 These markets include the products market,
the employment market, the capital market, and the market
for corporate control. 12 ' Together, they form the structure
through which the board of directors of a corporation is
constrained. 129
Because of a board of directors' wide range of
discretion, the market for corporate control remains
essential to constrain self-dealing by management and the
board. In order for the market for corporate control to
operate efficiently, directors should not be allowed to
have complete control over defensive tactics, especially
See Ralph Winter, Government and the Corporation 5-46 (1978);
Alison Greg Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and
Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 738, 784-87 (1978); Ronald J.
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 845 (1981)
(citing Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 300-13 (2d ed. 1977));
Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and
Means Reconsidered, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 388, 389 (1977) (examining the
allocation of power in the modern corporation) ; see also Lucian Arye
Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1028, 1034-51 (1982) (arguing that the facilitation of
corporate auctions is desirable for both target shareholders and
society); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Managemnet in Responding To a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1161, 1173-74 (1981) (arguing that the facilitation of corporate
auctions is undesirable and that corporate directors and managers
should therefore be passive in such situations -- in effect, corporate
directors and managers should never use defensive tactics)
.
128
. See Gilson, supra note 212, at 845.
129
. See id.; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the
Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539 (1996) (arguing
that lockups can affect the outcome of bidding contests and that
"judicial leniency toward lockups would both weaken the disciplinary
influence of the takeover threat and reduce the number of value-
enhancing acquisitions that occur").
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effective defensive tactics like the poison pill. 1
Allowing directors to have such power would give them a
degree of control over tender offers similar to that
enjoyed in the context of mergers and sales of assets. 1
Such a degree of control would fundamentally alter the
corporate structure in a way that would provide the board
with an effective monopoly over corporate control. 1 In
this situation, corporate control would only be transferred
if the benefits to management from the transfer exceeded
the value to management of its existing power. 1 ' Such a
result is inefficient both for shareholders and the economy
as a whole. 134
In a big market like China, establishing a market
for corporate control is extremely important for increasing
economic efficiency. In the past years, government plays an
important role in appointing or taking corporate directors.
Under the market for corporate control model, shareholders
See Gilson, supra note 219, at 846
133
. See id.
. See id. This is because shareholders would rarely receive premiums
for their shares. In addtion, the failure of management to maximize the
corporation' s wealth (because of the monopoly power the board maximizes
its own wealth) would frequently mean less profitable corporations. It
is also unlikely that investors would be willing to sink much money
into corporations that are being run for the benefit of management.
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should have a decisive role in determining the tenure of
corporate directors. Government can only function as a
shareholder. Through shareholder meetings, or proxy
contests, government can also elect directors, or move and
replace directors.
A market for corporate control in China is also
important for private corporation and foreign investment.
It is clear that in the future the merger and acquisition
activity between Chinese and foreign corporation will
increase. A market for corporate control can relocate
corporate assets to good management, increase productivity
and efficiency. A perfect corporate takeover legal
framework will increase foreign investors' confidence, and
also let Chinese corporations have a chance to join world
markets
.
V. Conclusion
The poison pill is a complicated defense measure.
Although its adoption does not necessarily breach a board
of directors' fiduciary duty, but the subsequent board
decisions, as to whether or not to redeem the pill in face
of a bid, may.
When evaluating poison pill plans, courts should
utilize the modified business judgment rule developed in
Unocal and Moran. This approach will ensure that
shareholder wealth maximization remains the primary goal of
all defensive tactics. First, the board must prove the plan
was adopted in good faith and pursuant to a reasonable
investigation into the existing damages. Second, the board
must show that its adoption of a poison pill plan was
reasonable in relation to the actual threat posed.
When faced with an actual tender offer the board
should have a duty to react in an informed manner to
maximize shareholder wealth. In some cases, if adopted with
the proper guidelines in mind, a rights plan may reinforce
the underpinnings of our corporate laws, rather than
distorting them, by providing directors with greater time,
56
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opportunity, and bargaining power to exercise their
fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of shareholders.
The shareholder by-law amendment has developed as
a response to the unjustified adoption of a poison pill or
refusal to redeem a poison pill by boards of directors.
Shareholder by-law amendments allow a corporation's
shareholders to prohibit a board of directors from adopting
a poison pill and to require redemption of an existing
pill. It properly places ultimate power for corporate
control transactions in the hands of the owners of the
corporation: the shareholders.
Courts should follow the Fleming 13 ' court's lead
and hold this type of action legal. The Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) provides a solid statutory authority
for vesting this power in the hands of shareholders. While
the DGCL gives the board of directors the power to run the
business and affairs of the corporation, this power is
subject to the shareholders' power to adopt and amend by-
laws .
International Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., Inc.,
No. 97-6035, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2980 (W.D.Okla. Jan. 24, 1997).
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